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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH SANTINA, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
Case No. 
14818 
DELMAR LARSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Joseph Santina, petitioned the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for a writ of habeas corpus based upon his 
allegation that the extradition documents demanding his 
return to Illinois were insufficient to sustain the 
requested extradition (R.2,3). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
was denied by the Third Judicial District Court on September 
30, 1976, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. Judge, 
presiding ( R. 7) • 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that this Court affirm the 
decision of the lower court and expedite Illinois' 
extradition request. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Santina was charged by indictment 
on December 23, 1973, with the crimes of failure to 
appear and criminal conspiracy in the State of Illinois. 
On April 1, 1976, the appellant was arrested, booked, and 
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County J~il and, on 
April 7, 1976, he was charged with the crime of being a 
fugitive from justice in the State of Utah. On May 19, 
1977, the Utah Governor's Office received extradition 
papers for appellant from the State of Illinois. 
On June 30, 1976, counsel for appellant 
petitioned the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for a writ of 
habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that the documents 
demanding petitioner's extradition to Illinois were 
substantively lacking and not in proper form as 
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953) (R.2,3). 
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On September 30, 1976, petitioner's writ was 
argued by counsel for petitioner and counsel for respondent 
before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. (R.7). Said 
petition was denied by Judge Hanson, Sr., and petitioner 
was ordered extradited as soon as possible (R.7). 
On October 14, 1976, petitioner filed a notice 
of appeal with this Court (R.8). On March 31, 1977, the 
Supreme Court Clerk send appellant's attorney a notice 
of default. Subsequently, on April 28, 1977, this Court 
granted appellant an extension of time until May 31, 1977, 
to file his brief on appeal. Failing to proceed with this 
appeal, the Supreme Court Clerk sent a second notice of 
default to counsel for appellant on June 24, 1977. On 
August 4, 1977, counsel for respondent submitted a motion 
to dismiss for failure to prosecute based upon the above 
mentioned facts. On August 12, 1977, this Court granted 
appellant's counsel until August 18, 1977, to file a brief 
with this Court, under penalty of dismissal. 
Appellant's brief was submitted on August 19, 
1977, challenging the disposition of the petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in the lower court. Presently, 
Illinois is still awaiting the the extradition of the 
fugitive which they originally sought on May 19, 1976. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GOVERNOR OF UTAH SHALL RECOGNIZE A DEMAND FOR 
EXTRADITION FROM A DEMANDING STATE WHERE THE EXTRADITION 
DOCUMENTS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPORT WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIRE-
MENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-56-3 (1953). 
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in 
not finding that the extradition documents from the 
demanding state did not comply with the statutory require-
ments set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), that 
there is no evidence to support an arrest warrant by the 
Governor of Utah, and therefore, that the appellant was 
unlawfully deprived of his liberty by the State of Utah. 
Respondent asserts that the documents of the 
demanding state complied with Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), 
in every essential part. 
Before the Governor of the State of Utah can 
issue an arrest warrant for a fugitive requested by a 
demanding state, Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), requires 
that the demanding state present documents of a specific 
form and substance. Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), 
states: 
-4-
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"No demand for the extradition 
of a person charged with crime in 
another state shall be recognized by 
the governor unless in writing 
alleging, except in cases arising 
under section 77-56-6, that the accused 
was present in the demanding state at 
the time of the commission of the alleged 
crime, and that thereafter he fled from 
the state, and accompanied by a copy 
of an indictment found or by information 
supported by affidavit in the state 
having jurisdiction of the crime, or by 
a copy of an affidavit made before a 
magistrate there, together with a copy 
of any warrant which was issued thereupon 
or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or 
of a sentence composed in execution, 
together with a statement by the executive 
authority of the demanding state that the 
person claimed has escaped from confinement 
or has broken the terms of his bail, 
probation or parole. The indictment, 
information or affidavit made before the 
magistrate must substantially charge the 
person demanded with having committed a crime 
under the !Aw of that state and the copy of 
indictment, information, affidavit, judgment 
of conviction or sentence must be authenticated 
by the executive authority making the demand." 
Once the Governor determines that the request of the 
demanding state sufficiently meets the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), he may then sign a warrant for the arrest 
of the fugitive. Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-7 (1953). 
In the instant case, the documents from the demanding 
state were clearly sufficient to justify execution of an 
arrest warrant by the Governor of Utah. 
-5-
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The documents presented by the State of Illinois 
state that appellant Santina was in Illinois at the time 
of the corn.mission of the crimes of calculated criminal drug 
conspiracy, unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, 
unlawful delivery of cannabis, and unlawful possession of 
cannabis. It is further stated by the Governor of Illinois 
that appellant Santina thereafter fled from Illinois and 
took refuge in the State of Utah. 
The extradition papers contain a Bill of Indict-
ment, filed in the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial 
Circuit, Will County, State of Illinois, by a Grand Jury 
charging appellant with the commission of the above mentioned 
crimes. The extradition documents further contain a Criminal 
Capias (bench warrant) commanding the sheriff of Will County, 
State of Illinois, to take appellant into custody. The 
attached affidavit of Keith Kostelny, Deputy Sheriff, 
Will County, states that appellant Santina made bail in 
the amount of $30,000, but on September 30, 1974, failed to 
appear for trial, thus violating the terms of his bail agreeme: 
Finally, the request by the Governor of Illinois 
states that appellant Santina stands charged with the above 
mentioned crimes under the laws of Illinois. The Governor's 
requisition concludes by authenticating all the papers 
and documents annexed to his extradition request. 
-6- l 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Each essential document and needed recital was 
set forth in the request from the demanding state, fulfil1ing 
the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953), and a1lowing 
the Governor to sign an arrest warrant for the extradition 
of appellant. 
Respondent notes that appellant's brief fails to 
allege those particulars he feels are lacking in the extra-
dition documents of the demanding state. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-56-3 (1953), sets forth the precise documentary requ~re­
rnents for extradition; providing various alternatives for 
escapees, and bail bond, probation, a~ parole violators. 
Each specific circumstance requires a different form of 
documentation. In the instant case, the extradition papers 
of the demanding state contain documentation sufficient for 
the return of a bail bond violator--appellant's current 
status. Appellant cites Little v. Beckstead, 11 Utah 2d 270, 
358 P.2d 93 (1961), as requiring additional documentation 
not contained in the papers of the demanding state. 
Respondent notes that Little dealt with the return of a 
fugitive to Oregon after the completion of a term in the 
Utah State Prison. Little had been previously convicted of 
burglary and forgery in Oregon and had fled the state pending 
the outcome of an appeal. Thus, the two cases are factual1y 
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dissimilar and require different extradition documentation. 
Finally, respondent notes that the extradition 
papers of the demanding state sufficiently comply with 
Illinois Annotated Statutes 60 § 40, which statute is identic. 
to Utah Code Ann.§ 77-56-23 (1953), which requires: 
"When the return to this state of 
a person charged with crime in this 
state is required the prosecuting attorney 
shall present to the governor his written 
application for a requisition 
for the return of the person charged, in 
which application shall be stated the name 
of the person so charged, the crime 
charged against him, the approximate time, 
place and circumstances""of its commission, 
the state in which he is believed to be, 
including the location of the accused 
therein at the time the application is 
made, and certifying that in the opinion 
of the said prosecuting attorney the ends 
of justice require the arrest and return 
of the accused to this state for trial and 
that the proceeding is not instituted to 
enforce a private claim. 
(b) When the return to this state is 
required of a person who has been convicted 
of a crime in this state and has escaped 
from confinement or broken the terms of 
his bail, probation or parole the prosecuting 
attorney of the county in which the offense 
was committed, the parole board, or the 
warden of the institution or sheriff of the 
county from which escape was made shall present 
to the governor a written application for a 
requisition for the return of such person, 
in which application shall be stated the name 
of the person, the crime of which he was 
convicted, the circumstances of his escape 
from confinement, or of the breach of the 
terms of his bail, probation or parole, t~ 
state in which he is believed to be, therein including the location of the person 
at the time application is made. 
.. 
-8-
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(c) The application shall be verified 
by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicat~, 
and shall be accompanied by two certified 
copies of the indictment returned, or 
information and affidavit filed, or of the 
complaint made to the judge or magistrate 
stating the offense with which the accused 
is charged, or of the judgment or conviction, 
or of the sentence. The prosecuting officer, 
parole board, warden, or sheriff may also 
attach such further affidavits and other 
documents in duplicate as he shall deem 
proper to be submitted with such application. 
One copy of the application with the action 
of the governor indicated by endorsement 
thereon and one of the certified copies of 
the indictment, complaint, information and 
affidavits or of the ju~gment of conviction 
or of the sentence shalf be filed in the 
office of the secretary of state to remain 
of record in that off ice. The other 
copies of all papers shall be forwarded with 
the governor's requisition." 
Thus, had the extradition papers of the demanding state be~n 
prepared by Utah authorities for the extradition of a 
similar fugitive, they would have sufficiently complied with 
Utah law. 
It is clear that the above mentioned extradition 
request substantially comports with all the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953). 
-9-
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POINT II 
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO FILE FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellant alleges that counsel for the State 
failed to file findings of fact or conclusions of law 
after his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was 
denied and contends that he was substantially prejudiced 
thereby. 
First, respondent notes that appellant has mistaken: 
placed the blame for the failure to fibe findings of fact 
and conclusions of law upon counsel for the State. It is 
not respondent's duty to make and file such findings and 
conclusions, but the duty of the trial court Harmon v. 
Rasmussen, 13 Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962), LeGrand 
Johnson Corp.v. Peterson, 18 Utah2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966). 
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1953), provides: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall, unless the same was waived, 
find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon and direct 
the entry of the appropriate judgment~ and 
in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. The 
-10-
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findings of a master to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. Findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are un-
necessary on decisions of motions under 
Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except 
as provided in Rule 4l(b)." (Emphasis 
added) 
Next, respondent asserts that the trial court's 
failure to make and file such findings and conclusions is, 
at best, harmless error and does not constitute 
reversible error. 
provides: 
Rule 61, Rules of Civil Procedure (195~), 
"No error in either the"' admission or 
the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceed-
ing must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties~ 
(Emphasis added) 
This "substantial rights" test has been consistently 
followed in our decisional law. In Ortega v. Thomas, 14 
Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963), this Court considered 
alleged errors in jury instructions and improper cormnents 
-11-
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by the trial court concerning the evidence presented 
at trial. Finding no reversible error and citing Rule 
61, this court stated: 
"In order to justify reversal, the 
appellant must show error that was sub-
stantial and prejudicial in the sense 
there is at least a reasonable likelihood 
that in the absense of the error the 
result would have been different." 
383 P.2d at 408. 
Thus, for appellant to prevail on appeal, he 
must show that the trial court's failure to file findings 
of fact and conclusions of law was such prejudicial error 
that "there is at least a reasonable 1..,1-kelihood" that, 
excluding such an error, the result would have been 
different. Clearly appellant cannot show such. Even if 
the trial court had filed findings and conclusions, its 
decision denying appellant's petition could have in no 
way been altered or changed. Therefore, failure to file 
findings of fact and conclusions of law aoes not 
constitute substantial and prejudicial error mandating 
reversal. This court's previous pronouncements regarding 
the above-discussed error affirm this principle. 
In Snyder v. Allen, 51 U. 291, 169 P. 945 
(1917), the trial court failed to make findings upon 
material issues presented by defendant's answer and 
counterclaim. This court held that: 
-12-
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" ... while the failure of the trial 
court to find upon all the material 
issues presented by the pleadings was 
clearly error, the error, as we view 
the record before us, did not affect 
any substantial right of the defendants, 
and this court will not reverse the 
judgment where the error thus excepted 
to and complained of resulted in no 
prejudice to the defendants." 169 P. 
at 945. 
In Petty v. St. George Garage Co., 60 U. 
126, 206 P. 720 (1922); In re Love's Estate, 75 U. 342, 
285 P. 299 (1930); and Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 
374, 423 P.2d 657 (1967), this court was again faced with 
the problem of omitted findings and co~clusions. In 
each instance, this Court affirmed its ruling in Snyder 
v. Allen, supra. 
Therefore, the trial court's failure to file 
findings of fact and conclusions of law was not pre-
judicial to appellant and cannot constitute error of such 
a nature that reversal is required. 
When reviewing a case where findings of fact and 
conclusions of law have been omitted, this court will assume 
facts in accordance with the decision of the lower court. 
In Mower v. McCarthy, 122 u. ·l, 245 P.2d 224 (1952), this 
Court ruled: 
-13-
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"In reviewing a case of this kind 
where issues of fact are involved and there 
are no findings of fact, we do not review 
the facts but assume that the trier of the 
facts found them in accord with its 
decision, and we affirm the decision if 
from the evidence it would be reasonable 
to find facts to support it. See Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49{a). 
This is the same procedure which is 
followed where a jury returns a general 
verdict without disclosing its findings 
on the facts, and in administrative 
agency cases where findings of fact 
are not required, but we cannot review 
the facts."245 P.2d at 226. 
In the instant case, the lower court denied 
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (R.7). 
Respondent admitted petitioner's alleg~tion numbers one 
(1) and three (3) and denied allegation number two (2) 
(R.4). Petitioner's allegation number two (2) contended 
that the extradition papers of the demanding state did 
not comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. S 
77-56-3 (1953) (R.2). Obviously, when the trial court 
denied petitioner's writ, it decided only issue number 
two (2) and must have necessarily decided that the 
extradition docwnents of the demanding state complied 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 (1953). 
Respondent asserts, therefore, that in accordance 
with the rule announced in Mower v. McCarthy, supra, this 
Court should assume that the trial judge found the 
-14- • 
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extradition documents to be sufficient, in accordance 
with his decision, and affirm the decision of the lower 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that an examination of 
the extradition papers of the demanding state reveals 
that said documents comply in every respect with the 
statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-56-3 
(1953), and justify the issuance of a Governor's 
Warrant by the Governor of Utah for the return of the 
fugitive to the demanding state. ~ 
Respondent also contends that the failure of 
the trial court to make and file findings of fact and 
conclusions of law is, at best, harmless error and 
cannot be considered reversible error. 
Finally, due to the numerous delays with 
respect to this extradition, including the notices of 
default and the extensions connected with this appeal, 
respondent urges this Court to expedite ruling on the 
appeal and permit the fugitive appellant to be returned 
-15-
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,. 
to the demanding state forthwith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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